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This study examines how the Swedish earned income tax credit (EITC) introduced in
2007 affected the labor supply of men and women living in two-adult households and
the extent to which children in the household affected the outcome. Because the EITC
is non-targeted in Sweden, it is difficult to form a meaningful comparison group for a
regular ex-post quasi-experimental evaluation of the reform. Therefore, a structural
discrete choice labor supply model for two-adult households is formulated and used in
an ex ante analysis. In a first step, estimates from the structural labor supply model are
used to determine the wage elasticities of the labor supply of men and women
separately, both with and without children in the household. Our results correspond to
those previously reported in the academic literature: somewhat larger wage elasticities
are found for women than for men, while similar labor supply responses are found for
men and women when there are no children in the household. In a second step, the
labor supply model is used to simulate the labor supply responses to the EITC. Our
results indicate that the largest response is on the extensive margin, with an increase in
the labor force participation of both men and women. While the labor supply effect on
the intensive margin is smaller, it is positive for both men and women working part-
time. However, the presence of children affects work hours differently for men and
women working part-time or not at all. For men, the percentage change in the work
hours was much higher for those living in a household without children, whereas for
women, the changes are almost the same for the two types of households.
JEL codes: J21; H24
Keywords: Structural discrete labor supply model, EITC, Younger children, Two-adult
households1 Introduction
A notable trend within OECD countries has been the increasing popularity of “Making
Work Pay” policies in the form of an earned income tax credit (EITC) and in-work benefits
in general, which are often targeted toward low-income earners and/or families with children
(Sørensen, 2010). For example, the EITC introduced in the United States in 1975 aimed to
offset the adverse distributional and incentive effects of federal income and payroll taxes on
low-income workers. Similarly, the Working Tax Credit (WTC) introduced in the United
Kingdom in 2003 is a payment from the state to employed people with low incomes.1
In Sweden, the EITC policy was first introduced in 2007 and thereafter expanded an-
nually until 2011. The design and the institutional settings of the EITC in Sweden2016 Andrén and Andrén. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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policy that was designed to provide incentives for working-age individuals outside
the labor force to work at least part-time and for part-time workers to increase
their hours of work, especially among low-income earners. Compared with inter-
national counterparts (e.g., in the US and the UK), the tax burden in Sweden is
higher, and the EITC rules are less complex and less difficult to grasp. Further-
more, the Swedish EITC does not include a phase-out bracket in which marginal
tax rates are increased.2 These three aspects suggest that the Swedish EITC may
have a greater impact on the labor supply. However, in Sweden, before the intro-
duction of the EITC, labor force participation was already high from an inter-
national standpoint, the wage structure was rather compressed, and wage flexibility
was relatively low, which pushes in the opposite direction and suggests that the ef-
fects of EITC might be smaller. The overall effect of the EITC reform in Sweden
is therefore an empirical question that has not been fully settled.
Because the tax credit is non-targeted in Sweden, it is not clear how to form a suit-
able control group for an analysis based on observational data. In an attempt to evalu-
ate the reform, Edmark et al. (2012) exploited the fact that different people with a
given earned income have tax reductions (EITC) that differ in size depending on the
municipality in which they live.3 Because it is more likely to find larger effects on the
extensive margin, Edmark et al. (2012) focused their analysis on the employment effects
on a group of individuals aged 20–64. The effects were estimated for the entire sample
and for married and single individuals separately. From their most preferred specifica-
tion, they received a significant estimate of a 3.3 percentage point change in employ-
ment for the entire group. Their estimates for the different subgroups revealed a
somewhat mixed picture, with some negative and some positive estimates. Singles had
larger responses then married individuals, and women were more responsive then men.
However, their estimated placebo effects were similar in size to the estimated reform ef-
fects. Edmark et al. (2012) therefore concluded that the limited variation in the size of
the tax deduction among individuals in combination with complex employment trends
both before and after the EITC reform(s) presented a major challenge to evaluating the
employment effects of the Swedish EITC. Therefore, their overall assessment was that
their results could not be credibly interpreted as effects of the EITC.4 To date, no suc-
cessful ex-post evaluation of the EITC reform using microdata has been carried out,
and therefore, only results from ex ante analyses are available (e.g., Ericson et al., 2009).
In Sweden, as in many other countries, there is an ongoing debate on how to increase
the hours of work in the economy. A special focus has been directed towards women
because they work fewer hours and have a lower labor force participation rate than
men. Because the labor supply of men and women are rather similar at the beginning
of their careers, that is, until between ages 30 and 35, family nesting and children seem
to affect men and women differently in terms of their labor supply behavior. Many
women reduce their labor supply when their children are of preschool age, despite the
fact that municipalities are obligated to provide childcare for children aged 1–12 years.
This reality tends to be a problem because many women continue to work part-time
when their children become older. In particular, with respect to part-time work, there
appears to be a state dependence that is initiated for women when children arrive in
the household. This behavior is not observed for men.
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ual commitment to work among men and women who live together in a two-adult
household and, in particular, the extent to which children in the household affect men’s
and women’s labor supply. Because the Swedish EITC policy is non-targeted, it is diffi-
cult to evaluate its effects ex post; therefore, we formulate and estimate a structural
discrete choice labor supply model ex ante using representative samples of Swedish
two-adult households with and without children in 2007, the year when the EITC pol-
icy was first introduced.
In a first step, we evaluate our structural model by determining wage elasticities for
men and women using the estimated preferences to simulate the response from a one-
percent increase in gross hourly wages on worked hours and labor market non-
participation. Our results are in line with wage elasticities reported in other studies
using Swedish data, which indicates that the wage elasticities differ between men and
women in two-adult households. Women increased their labor supply by 0.07 percent
regardless of whether they had children, whereas men with and without children in the
household increased their labor supply by approximately 0.04 percent and 0.06 percent,
respectively.
In a second step, the estimated labor supply preferences are used to simulate the
EITC effects on labor supply and disposable income of men and women separately,
with and without children in the household. Our simulation of the EITC effect shows a
somewhat different picture than that of the wage elasticities, which comes as no sur-
prise because the percentage change in disposable income from the EITC is larger for
those with lower wages who work fewer hours. The results show that the effect on the
extensive margin dominates the intensive margin for both men and women. Further-
more, the presence of children in the household creates a difference between men and
women for those that work part-time or not at all: for households without children, the
response is about the same among men and women; however, for households with chil-
dren, the response of men is about the same as that of men in households without chil-
dren, while the response of women is about half the response of women in households
without children. This finding indicates that children in the household have a clear in-
hibitory effect on women’s labor supply, which makes women with children less re-
sponsive to economic incentives, but not on men’s labor supply.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a short review of
the results from the academic literature. In section 3, the empirical model used in the
analysis is described. The data are presented in section 4, followed by a discussion of
the empirical results in section 5. The paper ends with a concluding section.
2 Earlier literature
The previous academic literature suggests that there are large variations in the labor
supply, or working hours, across countries and over time. For example, at the begin-
ning of 2000, Americans worked approximately as much as they did in 1970, whereas
Europeans worked almost 50 percent less (Alesina et al., 2006). These differences may
be explained by European labor market regulations, which do not appear to have in-
creased employment but instead increased the returns to leisure as more people took
longer vacations. These differences may also be explained by the generous social insur-
ance systems in Europe, which, for example, in Sweden, cover absences from work due
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and transfer systems) that make labor market work less attractive (binding). Therefore,
to implement relevant actions to increase work incentives, we must better understand
individuals’ preferences for work, how they differ among groups, and how tax and
benefit reforms actually affect households, their income distribution, and their employ-
ment behavior (Altman, 2001). Bargain et al. (2012) attempt to fill this gap by present-
ing the first large-scale international comparison of labor supply elasticities for 17
European countries and the US by gender and marital status separately. Measurement
differences were determined using a harmonized empirical approach (a discrete choice
model that accounts for the actual country-specific tax benefit policies that affect
household budgets) and comparable data sources (25 representative micro-datasets
covering 18 countries and two years of data for 7 countries). The datasets cover a rela-
tively short time period (1998–2005), which facilitates cross-country comparisons.
Three results important for welfare analysis are consistent across all countries: 1) the
extensive (participation) margin dominates the intensive (hours) margin; 2) except for
singles, income elasticities are extremely small; and 3) the results for the cross-wage
elasticities of couples are consistent with complementarity in spouses’ leisure in the US
versus substitution in spouses’ household production in Europe.
The wage elasticity estimated using Swedish data from the 1990s and 2000s (Table 8
in the Appendix) varies according to household type, ranging from 0.05 for married/
cohabiting men and foreign-born single women to approximately 0.10 for married/
cohabiting women and single men and to 0.77 for single mothers. However, Blomquist
and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990) suggested that the estimation of the labor market partici-
pation response to changes is sensitive to the use of restrictive functional forms and the
practice of evaluating female and male wage rate elasticities at different points along the
labor supply functions.5
Another aspect relevant to our analysis is that most earlier findings suggest that
EITC policies have been particularly successful in increasing the labor supply along
the extensive margin (i.e., the choice to participate in the labor force) without ana-
lyzing or reporting results regarding the intensive margin (number of hours
worked). When Saez (2002) modeled labor supply responses along both the inten-
sive and extensive margins, he reported that the optimal transfer program is a clas-
sical negative income tax program with substantial guaranteed income support and
a large phasing-out tax rate when behavioral responses are concentrated along the
intensive margin. When behavioral responses are concentrated along the extensive
margin, the optimal transfer program is similar to the EITC, with negative mar-
ginal tax rates at low income levels and a small guaranteed income. When the
labor supply is flexible only at the extensive margin, an egalitarian society will want
to subsidize work at the lower end of the wage distribution by allowing the effect-
ive marginal labor income tax rate to be negative for the lowest-paid workers.
When in-work benefits are mean tested against household income, perverse incen-
tives to work may exist for individuals in couples in which one spouse already
worked. Eissa and Hoynes (2004) documented a perverse negative income effect on
the wives of low-income working men in the US, and Blundell et al. (2000) re-
ported strong evidence of negative employment effects in the UK among working
wives in low-income families in which both adults work.
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ried women than for married men (see Meghir and Phillips, 2010). In magnitude, wage
elasticities are usually smaller for married people than for singles. The same can be said
regarding the elasticities related to participation decisions.
Nevertheless, previous studies on differences between men and women in the labor
supply responses to EITC for households with and without children are scarce, thus
highlighting the relevance of our results.
3 Empirical framework
Our empirical framework is based on Keane and Moffitt’s (1998) structural model of
multiple welfare program participation and the labor supply, which was used to study
the labor supply of single mothers and how it was affected by different types of welfare
programs received simultaneously in the US. A similar model was also used to analyze
the labor supply of single mothers in Sweden, with a focus on the simultaneous use of
paid (municipal) childcare and welfare benefits (Andrén, 2003).
3.1 A labor supply model for a two-adult household
The structural labor supply model in this study consists of a utility function that cap-
tures the household’s preferences for work and consumption and a budget constraint
that represents the household’s disposable income. The size of the household’s dispos-
able income depends on the choices the adults in the household make in terms of
hours of work, given the wage rates of the spouses. A convenient way to model two-
adult household preferences is to use a quadratic direct utility function, which, in
principle, consists of the sum of two individual utility functions. In its most basic form,
the household’s utility function has three arguments: hours of work for men (Hm),
hours of work for women (Hw), and household disposable income (Y). It is expressed as
follows:
U Hm;Hw;Yð Þ ¼ βmHm þ βwHw þ βyY þþαmH2m þ αwH2w þ αmyHmY
þ αwyHwY þ αwmHwHm
ð1aÞ
The quadratic direct utility function is simple and convenient to use and yet flexible
enough to allow for backward-bending labor supply behaviors.6 The model is discrete
because the hours of work for men and women take a finite number of discrete alterna-
tives from which individuals can choose.7 In this study, seven discrete work hour alter-
natives per adult household member are used: H ∈ {0, 12, 27, 35, 38, 41, 50}.8
Some individuals in the sample have unobserved wages (i.e., the individual's labor sup-
ply is zero). This constitutes a problem because the estimation method used requires nu-
merical values for all individuals. This situation is often handled by replacing the
unobserved wages with predictions based on observable wages (controlling for sample se-
lection).9 Replacing missing wages with predicted wages has the effect of introducing two
distinct distributions of wages depending on whether individuals are observed to be work-
ing or not. Ignoring this issue makes the statistical specification of the likelihood function
misspecified, as illustrated by MaCurdy et al. (1990). An alternative would be to replace
both observed and unobserved wages with predicted wages (e.g., Meghir and Phillips,
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to be misspecified for all individuals because it is based on predicted rather than observed
wages.
A more interesting approach suggested by van Soest (1995) is to estimate the wage
equations simultaneously with the utility function and integrate out the unobserved
wages of those who do not work. This method is efficient, leads to a correct stochastic
specification for all individuals and allows for the existence of a potential wage penalty
due to part-time work. The latter issue is relevant because a significant share of women
work part-time.10
Another relevant modeling aspect is related to the fact that not all households that
are eligible for social assistance are observed as recipients in the data. This means that
some households choose not to apply for social assistance, even though the household
is entitled to economic support. As a result, some households violate the assumption of
utility-maximizing behavior because the utility of a household is assumed to increase
with the disposable income. In the economic literature, this behavior is explained by
stigma effects associated with the use of social assistance (Moffitt, 1983). To avoid this
behavioral inconsistency, a flat component (φPSA) is augmented additively to the utility
function as follows:
U ¼ U Hm;Hw;Yð ÞþφPSA; ð1bÞ
where φ represents the “stigma” parameter, which is a measure of the stigma effect in
terms of (dis)utility associated with social assistance (SA), and PSA represents a binary
indicator that shows whether the household is an SA recipient or not. If social assist-
ance is associated with a stigma effect, this coefficient is expected to be negative and
significantly different from zero. However, there are several reasons why individuals do
not receive social assistance when they are eligible, which means that the estimated
stigma parameter should be interpreted with caution.11
Another important aspect related to the labor supply is the fixed costs of work. Fixed
costs of work refer to transportation costs, childcare costs, and/or any other costs initi-
ated when leaving the state of non-work. It can also refer to costs in terms of utility.
This assumption might be questionable, but in Sweden, there is a relatively low vari-
ation of these costs across households. Since 2002, a fee schedule cap has kept the costs
of childcare relatively low for households.12 The maximum amount paid by any house-
hold was SEK 2,280 (345 USD) per household per month in 2002 (Mörk et al., 2013).
We follow van Soest (1995) and control for these costs in terms of utility. Controlling
for the fixed costs of work in this way also tends to increase the precision of the labor
supply predictions produced by the model compared to the basic model that does not
control for fixed costs of work. Using this approach, the utility function is augmented
by adding adjustment terms for men and women separately:





γ igδig ; ð1cÞ
where δig represents an indicator variable for the labor supply alternative i and gender
g (i. e., g ∈ {m,w}) and γig is the corresponding parameter that represents the utility
loading associated with a specific labor supply alternative i for the man (m) or the
woman (w) in the household. The number of parameters (r) does not need to coincide
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usually takes a lower value. If the effect is associated with a disutility of work, the esti-
mated parameters take negative values and are measured in relative terms to the non-
work alternative.
The two-adult household’s joint disposable income is determined using the following
formula:
Y ¼ Ym þ Yw þ BSA XSAð ÞPSA þ BHA XHAð ÞPHA−CCC XCCð ÞPCC ð2Þ
Ym ¼ Hmwm þ Nm− tm−TCmð Þ Disposable income of the manð Þ ð3Þ
Yw ¼ Hwww þ Nw− tw−TCwð Þ Disposable income of the womanð Þ ð4Þ
Equations (3) and (4) represent the contributions specific to each adult to the house-
hold’s disposable income in addition to the common household components included
in eq. (2). The disposable income of men and women is determined by the gross wage
(w) rate, the weekly hours of work (H) and the non-labor income (N), which could be
both taxable and non-taxable. The gross income is reduced by the income tax (t) corre-
sponding to work and taxable non-labor income, which is reduced by the tax credit
(TC), the so-called EITC.
The first household component in eq. 2, BSA(XSA), is a function of the potential social
assistance and contributes to the household’s disposable income if the household is ob-
served as a receiver of social assistance (PSA = 1).
13 The second component, BHA(XHA),
is a function of the potential housing allowance if the household receives a housing al-
lowance (PHA = 1).
14 The third component, CCC(XCC), represents a function of the po-
tential cost of municipal childcare use if the household has younger children and uses
municipal childcare (PCC = 1).
15
Observed heterogeneity among individuals and household members is introduced
linearly through parameters θ1 = {γm, γw, δm, δw), which are allowed to vary condition-
ally on a set of variables (Z, X). In order to estimate the parameters of the model, it is
necessary to specify a stochastic structure. This is accomplished by allowing the size of
the labor supply parameters for men and women in the utility function to vary in terms
of unobservables. The structural labor supply model has four endogenous variables spe-
cified in the following way:
βm ¼ Zmγm þ ηm Labor supply preferences of menð Þ ð5Þ
βw ¼ Zwγw þ ηw Labor supply preferences of womenð Þ ð6Þ
ln wmð Þ ¼ Xmδm þ εm Wage equation for menð Þ ð7Þ
ln wwð Þ ¼ Xwδw þ εw Wage equation for womenð Þ; ð8Þ
where θ2 = (ηm, ηw, εm, εw) captures the unobserved heterogeneity and is assumed to be
distributed jointly normal with mean zero and covariance Σθ2 . This design has the ad-
vantage of not imposing the assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives
because it allows for correlation among the unobservables. The model is identified by
nonlinearities and discontinuities from tax benefit rules and by the distributional as-
sumption made on the unobservables.
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Because hours of work are modeled using a discrete variable, the estimation problem
can be formulated as a multiple-choice problem. In two-adult households in which
each household member has a choice set of seven discrete work hour alternatives, the
choice set for each household consists of 49 different alternatives. Let j = 1, 2, …, 49 be
the discrete alternatives for each household. The problem is to choose the alternative
that generates the highest utility for the household. That is, the household chooses al-
ternative j if and only if
Uj≥Uk for all k ¼ 1; 2;…; 49; k≠j; ð9Þ
where Uj represents the utility level calculated using eq. (1c) for alternative j, which is
obtained by substituting eqs. (2), (3), and (4) into eq. (1c) evaluated for alternative j.
Each household’s contribution to the likelihood function is represented by a probability
that corresponds to the observed labor supply alternative. We determine the contributing
probabilities that correspond to each alternative P(Uj ≥Uk) for all k = 1, 2, …, 49, k ≠ j, and
for each household in the sample by using the Kernel-Smoothed Frequency Simulator
proposed by McFadden (1989). This simulator is based on the extreme value distribution
function, which is used as a kernel for a standard frequency simulator. 16
Because two-adult households contribute to the likelihood function, four different states
are specified based on how many adults in the household work and, therefore, have ob-
servable wages: 1) households in which both the man and the woman work (d1 = 1); 2)
households in which the man works and the woman does not work ((d2 = 1)); 3) house-
holds in which the woman works and the man does not work (d3 = 1); and 4) households
in which neither the man nor the woman works d4 = 1. This specification gives rise to the
following log-likelihood function:





















d4 lnP jjθ;X;Zð Þ
;
ð10Þ
where i is an index over households and j is an index over the labor supply alternatives
for the household.
3.3 Simulation of the labor supply elasticity for men and women
The estimated parameters from the quadratic direct utility function are used to compute
the impact of the change in an individual’s disposable income on the labor supply. Using
these parameters, we determine the expected value of hours worked per week and the
labor supply elasticity of wages for men and women using the following formulas:
E H jY ;X½  ¼
X7
k¼1
P Hk jY ;Xð ÞHk Average hoursð Þ ð11Þ
ε ¼ E H jY 1;X½ −E H jY 0;X½ 
E H jY 0;X½  
1
0:01
Labor supply elasticityð Þ ð12Þ
The average hours of work are determined using the standard formula for the ex-pected value of a discrete random variable. The labor supply elasticity is simulated
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various work hour alternatives change when the hourly wage rate is changed by one
percent. Hence, to find the labor supply response to a change in the tax system, the ex-
pected value is determined with and without the EITC, which corresponds to two dif-
ferent disposable incomes (Y0 and Y1).4 Data and institutional settings
In Sweden, the EITC policy introduced in 2007 is a non-targeted tax credit that
depends on the taxpayer’s labor income, which includes earned income but not
taxable transfers. Earned income refers to wage income from work, and taxable
transfers refer to indirect employment-related incomes, such as sickness and paren-
tal leave benefits, unemployment benefits, and pension income. All labor income is
taxed by a proportional local municipal tax. In addition, there is a two-level state
tax on labor income above certain income levels, which makes the tax system pro-
gressive. In Sweden, married couples are taxed individually and are not subject to
joint taxation.
The EITC was gradually expanded between 2007 and 2010 (see Table 9 in the
Appendix).17 The size of the tax credit increases with earned income up to a cer-
tain level. Therefore, for taxpayers in these income ranges, the EITC reduces the
average tax rate on labor income for all and the marginal income tax for middle-
income earners and below.
The introduction of the Swedish EITC may be one explanation for the relatively high
levels of labor force participation (Fig. 1) and employment (Fig. 2) in Sweden during
the 2008–2012 global recession.
In this study, a representative random sample of two-adult households living in
Sweden during 2007 is used. The data were provided by Statistics Sweden (SCB)
and contain information from the Household’s finances (HEK) database, supple-
mented by individual information from other population registers.18 HEK is an an-
nual sample survey of approximately 10,000 households and was designed toFig. 1 Labor force participation of 16–64 year olds (percent) by gender; 2001–2014. Source: Own computation
based on Statistics Sweden’s Labour Force Surveys (LFS)
Fig. 2 Employed persons aged 16–64 (in thousands) by gender; 2001–2014. Source: Own computations
based on Statistics Sweden’s Labour Force Surveys (LFS). Note: Only permanent and temporary employment;
self-employed and family workers are excluded
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households and to describe living and housing costs for households.
Given the large difference in the labor supply of women across different types of
households, we chose to focus our analysis on two-adult households. However, given
that the taxpaying unit in Sweden is the individual and not the household, we analyze
men and women separately. Selection is limited to individuals aged 18–64 years who
are not early retired, self-employed, or studying (full- or part-time) and who live in a
two-adult household.19
In the next step, we excluded all households with children younger than one year
because all local governments in Sweden are obliged by law to provide, within 3–4
months of the parents’ request, highly subsidized, high-quality childcare for chil-
dren aged 1–12 whose parents either work or are full-time students. All parents
who apply for public childcare receive it (more or less if they apply in time). In
2004, 90% of all children in the 3–6 age group attended childcare. The enrollment
rate is also high for very young children (aged 1–2). One explanation for these
high enrollment rates is that daycare centers offer services during regular work
hours. Enrolled children spend on average 32 h per week at daycare. Although
children with mothers who work full-time remain in daycare for longer hours than
do those with mothers working half-time (34 vs. 21 h per week in 2005), very few
children, even those with both parents working full-time, attend daycare more than
40 h per week (Mörk et al., 2013).
In the last step, due to computational reasons, we randomly selected 50 percent of
the two-adult households, which resulted in the final sample of 1,875 two-adult house-
holds (1,051 households with children and 824 households without children). Descrip-
tive statistics of the individual and household variables used in the analysis are
presented in Table 1.
Two key variables of our analysis are the number of hours worked per week (H) and
the hourly wage rate. The number of hours worked per week is a construction based
on the degree of employment, which is calculated as a percentage of full-time working










Age (in years) 47.1 38.0 49.1 40.5
Educational level (%)
Normal school 11.7 10.2 13.1 12.4
High school 42.7 47.0 46.8 51.5
University 45.6 42.8 40.1 36.1
Worked hour per week (H) (%)
H > 34 65.7 46.2 80.7 82.5
0 < H < 34 25.9 38.8 12.0 12.6
H = 0 8.4 15.0 7.3 4.9
Hourly wage (SEK),a by H
H > 34 156 155 197 188
0 < H < 34 146 135 155 148
H = 0 - - -
Household characteristics
Children 1–5 years (%) - 49.2 - 49.2
Children 6–11 years (%) - 44.9 - 44.9
Children 12–18 years (%) - 43.6 - 43.6
Received housing allowance (%) 1.0 2.4 1.0 2.4
Received welfare allowance (%) 0.4 4.9 0.4 4.9
Swedish born (both) 79.6 71.9 79.6 71.9
Swedish born (one of them) 11.2 14.9 11.2 14.9
Foreign-born 9.2 13.2 9.2 13.2
Number of observations 824 1051 824 1051
Note: aAt exchange rates prevailing in 2007, the year before the first step of the Swedish EITC policy, 1 USD corresponds
on average to 6.8 SEK (Swedish Krona); and 1 EUR to 9.3 SEK
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vided by the standard of 2,080 h per year. An individual who has been unemployed or
on parental leave for the whole year has an employment degree of zero and is therefore
categorized as a non-participant in the labor force (i.e., his or her hours of work per
week is zero). For individuals who have been unemployed for less than a year but who
reported during the interview that they worked full-time, their hours of work were ad-
justed to less than full-time.
The HEK database includes information regarding hourly wage rates. However, a
monthly earnings rule rather than exception is the case for many state and municipal
employees. This signifies that the measure of the hourly earnings in the HEK is based
on the observed monthly salary and is adjusted to correspond to a full-time salary and,
in some cases, is scaled down to represent an hourly wage.
The descriptive statistics of work hours reported in Table 1 suggest that the labor
supply behaviors are different for men and women in the same household. Regardless
of whether there are children present in the household, men work full-time to a much
higher degree than women do, but the labor supply behaviors of men and women tend
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ence in the shares of men and women working zero hours is approximately the same
when no children are present in the household. All these differences indicate that there
will be differences in the response to the tax credit for married men and women.5 Results
5.1 Estimates of the labor supply model for a two-adult household
The parameter estimates associated with the preferences for the household labor supply
(Eqs. 5 and 6) are presented in Table 2 for both men and women. These estimates can
be interpreted as approximations of effects on the marginal utility of work,20 but be-
cause the estimates represent effects expressed in terms of utility, their values have no
clear interpretation. However, their signs reveal whether the household utility increases
or decreases as a result of changes in the hours of work for men and women,
respectively.
For households without children, only the intercepts are significant, which turns out
to be the case for both men and women. On the other hand, for households with chil-
dren, several significant effects are found. An interesting result is related to the esti-
mated effect of the number of children aged 1–5 years. An increase in the number of
young children in the household reduces the household utility of hours of work for
both men and women; in terms of household utility, this effect is twice as large for
women as it is for men.Table 2 Equations for labor supply preferences by gender and type of household
Married/Cohabitated without children Married/Cohabitated with children
Variables PE SE PE SE
Women
Constant 14.502* (1.359) 10.608* (1.198)
Age/10 -0.106 (0.459) 1.890 (0.996)
Educational level (CG: lower)
Medium (high school) 1.729 (1.608) 5.277* (1.868)
Higher (university) 2.780 (1.761) 7.950* (2.152)
Stockholm’s region 0.668 (1.543) 0.504 (1,382)
Swedish born 4.223 (1.681) 6.167* (1,546)
Number of children, 1–5 years old −4.377* (0.986)
Men
Constant 22.490* (3.217) 33.933* (2.333)
Age/10 −0.642 (0.514) −2.067* (0.793)
Educational level (CG: lower)
Medium (high school) −0.956 (1.705) 3.043* (1.419)
Higher (university) 0.146 (1.888) 1.869 (1.546)
Stockholm’s region −0.566 (1.476) 0.372 (1.331)
Swedish born 2.738 (1.738) 5.111* (1.261)
Number of children, 1–5 years old −2.551* (0.797)
Note: *stands for statistical significance at the 5 percent level or better
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by household type, while Table 4 presents the remaining parameter estimates of the
household’s utility function (e.g., fixed costs of work, stigma effects related to social as-
sistance and the covariance matrix for the unobservables). In Table 3, almost all param-
eters are estimated with good precision, and most of them are significant at a 5 percent
level. As an example, men with a university degree have, on average, a higher return to
their education than women. Interestingly, the highest return to education can be
found for men in households with children, while women in the same situation have
the lowest return to higher education.
The estimated interaction effect (αwm) between hours of work for men and women,
presented in Table 4, suggests how men and women in the household value their hours
of work. The interaction effect is positive and significant for households without chil-
dren and is small and negative but not significant for households with children. Hence,
children in the household seem to contribute to behavioral differences in terms of the
hours of work of men and women. For households without children, the hours of work
for the man and the woman are more complementary than those for households with
children. These results have implications for explaining the behavioral patterns that are
observed in Sweden for women with regard to how hours of work evolve during their
working lives. Both men and women primarily begin their labor market careers part-
time. Over time, the share of full-time workers, both men and women, increases. How-





Variables PE SE PE SE
Women
Constant 4.425* (0.052) 3.157* (0.109)
Age/10 0.141* (0.018) 0.690* (0.058)
Age*age/100 −0.014* (0.002) −0.072* (0.008)
Educational level (CG: lower)
Medium (high school) 0.032 (0.034) −0.021 (0.031)
Higher (university) 0.191* (0.033) 0.136* (0.032)
Stockholm’s region 0.159* (0.025) 0.134* (0.022)
Swedish born 0.050* (0.026) 0.071* (0.023)
Men
Constant 4.261* (0.101) 3.618* (0.078)
Age/10 0.231* (0.034) 0.473* (0.027)
Age*age/100 −0.021* (0.004) −0.049* (0.003)
Educational level (CG: lower)
Medium (high school) 0.051 (0.059) 0.136* (0.051)
Higher (university) 0.282* (0.060) 0.316* (0.048)
Stockholm’s region 0.072 (0.037) 0.181* (0.031)
Swedish born 0.102* (0.041) 0.183* (0.029)
Note: *stands for statistical significance at the 5 percent level or better
Table 4 Estimated utility function by gender and household type
Household without children Household with children
Utility parameters P.E. S.E. P.E. S.E.
αw −4.681
* 1.494 −5.317* 0.131
αm −2.909 8.248 −4.468* 0.598
αy 5.359* 1.623 2.395* 0.153
αwy −0.775* 0.389 −0.135* 0.059
αmy −0.875* 0.369 −0.134* 0.033
αwm 2.272* 0.573 −0.053 0.073
ϕ (Stigma effect) −48.66* 4.330 −38.87* 2.356
Men Women Men Women
Fixed cost P.E. S.E. P.E. S.E. P.E. S.E. P.E. S.E.
γ1(FC, H ∈ {12, 27}) −25.957* 2.672 −19.884* 1.416 −17,125* 1.938 −18.742* 1.248
γ2(FC, H ∈ {35}) −16.424* 1.154 −7.911* 2.582 −3,347* 0.837 −1.531* 0.227
γ3(FC, H ∈ {38}) −12.823* 3.134 15.883* 2.928 −3,178* 0.227 14.595* 2.582
γ4(FC, H ∈ {41}) 1.424 6.763 3.244 3.009 13,614* 0.490 5.238* 2.653
γ5(Fc, H ∈ {50}) −23.739* 4.536 −1.920 3.063 −4,901* 0.329 8.027* 2.700
Number of households 1648 2102
Log-likelihood/n −3,848 −3,805
Covariance matrix of unobservables
ηm ηw εm εw ηm ηw εm εw
ηm 139.60
* −0.096 0.108* 0.014 114.91* 0.507* 0.103* −0.001
ηw 134.86* −0.001 −0.011 189.12* 0.021 0.001
εm 0.159* 0.195* 0.145* 0.144*
εw 0.079* 0.092*
Note. *Significant at the 5% level. P.E. stands for parameter estimate. S.E. stands for standard error
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child. This behavior in terms of the hours of work is not observed for men.
As a way to evaluate the performance of the estimated model, it is useful to
check how well the model predicts actual data in terms of the distribution of work
hour alternatives. Table 10 in the Appendix shows the observed and fitted values
of the different work hour alternatives (in percentages), as well as the mean value
of worked hours (observed and predicted) for men and women in households with
and without children. The results show a fair fit between the mean values of ob-
served and predicted work hour alternatives. However, the model appears to have
difficulties in predicting the distribution of labor supply for some of the discrete al-
ternatives. For example, the model underestimates the work hours for women
working 38 and 41 h and overestimates the work hours for men working 41 h.5.2 Simulated labor supply elasticity
Using the estimates presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4, we calculate the expected value of
the hours worked per week and the labor supply elasticity of wages for men and
women separately and by the type of household. One should bear in mind that these
simulations are made over both intensive and extensive margins. Table 5 presents the
Table 5 Simulated responses (in percent) on labor supply by gender and type of household
Married/Cohabiting with children Married/Cohabiting without children
Women
Wage elasticity 0.07 0.07
Implicit wage elasticity 0.08 0.08
Not in the labor force −0.26 −0.40
Men
Wage elasticity 0.04 0.06
Implicit wage elasticity 0.05 0.06
Not in the labor force −0.37 −0.37
Note: The wage elasticity corresponds to the percentage change in mean hours of work when the gross wages over all
individuals change by one percent. The implicit wage elasticity corresponds to the ratio between the simulated change in
the mean hours of work and the percentage change in disposable income as a result of a 10 percent reduction in the
municipal tax rate. Not in the labor force corresponds to the effect on those that work zero hours
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the hourly wage rate for men and women separately and by household type. The results
indicate distinct reactions for men and women: regardless of whether they have
children, women’s wage elasticity is estimated to 0.07 percent, whereas men’s wage
elasticity is 0.04 percent with children and 0.06 percent without children. This dif-
ference is in line with previous research and is driven partly by the fact that
women had lower wages and worked fewer hours than men before the EITC policy
was introduced. However, our results for the extensive margin suggest that the re-
sponse of women is much smaller in households with children. That effect is not
found for men, which suggests that having children is an obstacle to women’s par-
ticipation in the labor market. Because no standard errors are available for the sim-
ulated responses, comparisons across the groups should be taken with care, as the
differences might not be statistically significant. 21
5.3 Simulated effects of the EITC
Next, the estimated labor supply preferences and disposable income, as predicted by
the structural labor supply model, are used to simulate the effects of the first four steps
of the EITC policy on both disposable income and the labor supply (both weekly hours
of work and changes in labor force participation) by gender for households with chil-
dren (Table 6) and households without children (Table 7). The effects are the percent-
age change for each EITC step in relation to a tax system without an EITC.
For all four steps of the EITC reform, there are relatively large differences between
the simulated EITC effects on the weekly worked hours of women and men within the
same type of household. In households with children, men worked on average approxi-
mately nine more hours per week than women. For example, after the fourth step,
women worked an average of 28.8 h per week, whereas men worked an average of
37.5 h per week (Table 6). For households with children, the difference was approxi-
mately 5 h per week. The fourth step revealed that the average worktime was 31.7 h
per week for women and 36.3 h for men (Table 7).
Furthermore, the presence of children affects work hours differently for men and
women. For men, the percentage change in the work hours was much higher for those
Table 6 The simulated effects of EITC on worked hours and disposable income of married/
cohabiting with children
Without EITC Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Women
Weekly worked hours 28.542 28.684 28.725 28.765 28.805
Work hours (%Δ) 0.498 0.641 0.781 0.921
Disposable income (%Δ) 4.514 5.785 6.991 8.205
Men
Weekly worked hours 37.359 37.455 37.481 37.507 37.533
Work hours (%Δ) 0.257 0.327 0.396 0.466
Disposable income (%Δ) 4.004 5.113 6.118 7.239
Note: The change in disposable income is based only on information from those who worked in 2007
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same for the two types of households. However, it is not clear a priori how an individ-
ual’s transitions between the different labor supply alternatives (our seven discrete
points) should appear because the potential behavior differs for part-time and full-time
workers and for those who worked more than the usual 40 weekly hours before the
introduction of the EITC reform. This idea follows from the mechanism by which the
substitution effect and income effect change as the hours of work and wage rates in-
crease over the intensive margin. Typically, the income effect dominates the substitu-
tion effect for those with high wages working full-time. Hence, the direction of the net
effect is likely to have a different sign for different individuals, leaving the mean net
value of the effect on the labor supply an empirical question.
On the extensive margin, the direction of the effect on the labor supply is less uncer-
tain because there is no income effect involved. Lower taxes with an increase in the dis-
posable income therefore increase the effect on the inflow to the labor force. Figure 3
illustrates how men and women respond to the reduced tax induced by the four steps
of EITC over the different discrete labor supply alternatives.
For households with children (Fig. 3a), the single largest effect occurs on the exten-
sive margin for both men and women: the share of women outside the labor force de-
creases by approximately 4 percent, whereas the corresponding reduction for men is
approximately 5 percent. Figure 3 also illustrates how men and women respond differ-
ently depending on whether there are children in the household. The most strikingTable 7 The simulated effects of EITC on worked hours and disposable income of married/
cohabiting without children
Without EITC Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Women
Weekly worked hours 31.382 31.538 31.584 31.629 31.675
Worked hours (%) 0.497 0.644 0.787 0.934
Disposable income (%) 4.602 5.902 7.143 8.384
Men
Weekly worked hours 36.042 36.177 36.216 36.255 36.294
Worked hours (%) 0.375 0.483 0.591 0.699
Disposable income (%) 3.982 5.082 6.140 7.190
Note: The change in disposable income is based only on information from those who worked in 2007
Fig. 3 Percentage change in the work hours between the (2010) fourth step of the EITC reform and the tax
system without the EITC by gender for Married/cohabitating with children (a) and Married/cohabitating
without children (b). Note: The horizontal axes show the different weekly work hour alternatives for each
individual in the household and the vertical axes show the percentage change that corresponds to each
alternative as a result of introducing EITC
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fewer than 35 h per week) or not working at all, whereas the responses for men are ap-
proximately the same in the two cases. Therefore, these results indicate that children
have an inhibitory effect on the labor supply of women, whereas the effect on the labor
supply of men attributable to the EITC can be considered independent of whether
there are children in the household. These results are interesting because married
women with no children in the household already work more hours than women with
children, but not to the same extent as men.
Regarding disposable income, our results indicate that the EITC had, on average, a
greater effect on women than on men for both types of households. This result was ex-
pected because before the EITC reform, women’s earned income was significantly lower
than that of men due to the fact that on average, women both have lower wages and
work fewer hours than men. When the EITC was introduced, women increased their
disposable income by approximately 8 percent, whereas men increased their disposable
income by approximately 7 percent.
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The Swedish EITC was designed to contribute to the well-functioning tax system
from the employment point of view by breaking the longstanding Swedish tradition
of taxing several types of social transfers together with earned income. Therefore,
the Swedish EITC was designed as a non-targeted tax credit that depends on the
taxpayer’s labor income, which includes earned income but not taxable transfers.
The overall purpose of the EITC was to increase the labor force participation and
make it more profitable for the individual to work. Because by construction, it in-
creases the net income from work, the EITC is expected to effectively reduce the
incentives of receiving incomes from sources other than work, such as unemploy-
ment benefits or sick benefits.
From an international point of view, the labor force participation rate in Sweden is
high for both men and women. However, it is an observed fact that women have lower
wages and work fewer hours than men. Nevertheless, part-time work is widespread
among women and is much more common than for men. Importantly, when men and
women start their careers on the labor market, part-time work is common for both
men and women, and the share of full-time workers increases over time. However, at
approximately 30–35 years of age, women’s average work hour halt and start to de-
crease and finally ends up stabilizing on a distinct lower level than that of men. This
change has been proven to be correlated to the time when children enlarge the house-
hold. These facts suggest that it is policy relevant to analyze the response to economic
incentives to work, such as those introduced by EITC for women and men who live in
two-adult households separately for households with and without small children.
Of particular importance is choosing the optimal econometric framework to estimate
the EITC effects in Sweden, where all employees with income from work receive the
tax credit. Consequently, it is not easy to evaluate the EITC effects post factum using
conventional non-experimental evaluation methods because there is no natural com-
parison group that receives no tax credit. Therefore, we formulated and estimated a
static structural discrete labor supply model for two-adult households and simulated
afterwards how the EITC steps affected both the labor supply and the disposable in-
come of men and women according to the type of household.
Our results suggest that the EITC brought more women into the labor market, which
might be interpreted as a successful contribution to the Swedish government’s goal of
reducing inequalities between men and women in the labor market. Furthermore, our
estimates of the EITC policy show that the labor supply effect on the intensive margin
is low, yet positive, for both men and women working part-time and that the presence
of children in the household induces differences between men and women. For men,
the percentage change in the work hours was much higher for those living in a house-
hold without children, whereas for women, the changes are almost the same for the
two types of households.
The differences between men’s and women’s responses to economic incentives seem
to be driven by how each individual’s working hours are valued in relation to one an-
other within a household; i.e., whether the corresponding hours of work for men and
women are complements or substitutes in the household. The estimated interaction ef-
fect between the hours of work for men and for women in the utility function answers
this question. In households without children, men and women tend to work similar
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women, which are not necessarily coordinated with their spouse’s hours of work. This
may indicate that if the man works full-time, the woman tends to reduce her work hours
and presumably dedicates more time to household work and childcare. This finding sug-
gests that with respect to part-time work, the state dependence induced by children in the
household can be partly remedied using economic incentives such as the EITC.
The most important finding across all results indicates that women working part-
time or not at all are less responsive to economic incentives than men when children
are present in the household. Hence, other means to increase their labor supply should
be used. These means should be driven by the fact that, by nature or as a result of soci-
etal norms, women take greater responsibility for the children than men do.
Endnotes
1The WTC replaced the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC), which operated from
April 1999 to March 2003. The WFTC was a transitional system from the earlier bene-
fit for working families, known as the Family Credit (FC), which had been in operation
since 1986. In addition to the WTC, people may also be entitled to the Child Tax
Credit (CTC) if they have custody of children.
2The official motivation for this design was based on the fear of negative marginal ef-
fects on the work incentives in the phase-out region of the income distribution. Mar-
ginal effects of this sort are particularly harmful when the wage distribution is
compressed, as it is in Sweden.
3The earned income tax credit in Sweden, by design, is a function of the municipal
tax rate. Because each municipality has the right to set their own tax rate, it varies in
size across municipalities. A higher municipal tax rate therefore generates a larger tax
credit in SEK for an individual with a given earned income. However, the tax reduction
for the same individual, measured as a percentage change, is approximately the same in
high- and low-tax-rate municipalities.
4In 2015, the municipal tax rates varied between 29.2 and 34.7 percent, with an aver-
age value of 31.99 percent. In 2007, the average municipal tax rate was 31.55 percent,
with a standard deviation that was approximately the same as in 2015. These differ-
ences generate rather small variations in tax reduction among individuals. Because a
higher municipal tax rate also implies more tax to pay, the variation in the net-of-tax
rate among municipalities for an individual with a given earned income is very small,
which indicates that their estimates depend on rather weakly identifying variations.
5Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990) estimated labor supply functions for mar-
ried men and women in Sweden using data from 1980, considering the complete form
of individuals’ budget constraints. Using a quadratic supply function, they evaluated the
female wage rate elasticity at the mean male sample values and reported a wage rate
elasticity of 0.10 for women and approximately 0.12 for men. The linear supply func-
tion with random preferences yielded a wage rate elasticity of approximately 0.45 to
0.80 and an income elasticity of approximately−0.04 to−0.06. The quadratic supply
function with fixed preferences yielded a wage rate elasticity of 0.37 calculated at the
mean sample values for working women and considering only the responses for work-
ing females. Evaluating elasticity at the mean sample values for the full sample and tak-
ing into account the labor-leisure choice, they obtained an elasticity of 0.58.
Andrén and Andrén IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2016) 5:3 Page 20 of 246This utility function is equivalent to the one with leisure (Lm, Lw) as the argu-
ment, such as U(Lm, Lw, Y), but avoids the necessity of explicitly representing the
total hours available for work and leisure. Because the direct utility function is
quadratic and includes an interaction term between the hours of work for men
and women, the marginal utility of hours of work for men and women are func-
tions of the level of hours of work for men and women and the level of disposable
household income. The parameter of the interaction term between the hours of
work for men and women (αwm) indicates whether the labor supplies of men and
women are complements or substitutes in the household.
7The choice of the number of worked hours is limited by a given number of discrete
alternatives. This approach, introduced by Van Soest (1995), has been frequently used
in the context of structural labor supply models because the econometric application is
greatly simplified compared to the choice of hours worked on a continuous variable.
This is especially true in the presence of highly non-convex budget constraints induced
by welfare benefits and complex tax structures. For the discrete approach, it is generally
very easy to determine whether the empirical model is economically grounded and
meets the requirement of utility-maximizing individuals.
8These choices are discrete approximations of the observed worked hours (h), with
the following associations: H = 0 when h = 0; H = 12 when 1 ≤ h ≤ 20; H = 27 when 21 ≤
h ≤ 30; H = 35 when 31 ≤ h ≤ 37; H = 38 when 38 ≤ h ≤ 39; H = 41 when 40 ≤ h ≤ 43; and
H = 50 when h ≥ 44. Accordingly, in our model, we use Hm∈{0,12,27,38,41,50} and
Hw∈{0,12,27,38,41,50}. The specific alternatives have been chosen to make each work-
hour group similar in size.
9This is a commonly used method that was first proposed by Hausman (1981). Impli-
citly, it is assumed that the predictions are made with no errors or that the prediction
errors are ignorable.
10Löffler et al. (2014) reported in a rather extensive simulation exercise that the cor-
rect treatment of wages in a structural labor supply model are crucial and that different
approaches affect the estimated labor supply elasticities very differently.
11In practice, this situation may, in many cases, be a matter of a lack of knowledge re-
garding eligibility for social assistance or a way to avoid an extensive investigation that
is expected to be very time-consuming for too little financial outcome. In addition, it
could also result from measurement errors in the data.
12The fee schedule cap has two components. First, the charge per child is deter-
mined as a fixed percentage of household income. The rate varies with the age
and birth order of the children, such that care for younger children and children
with few siblings in childcare costs more. Secondly, per-child fees are capped and
are thus constant beyond a monthly income ceiling, which was SEK 38,000 (5,770
USD) in 2002 (Mörk et al. 2013).
13BSA is a function of the age of the children, the number of children, housing rent,
and the disposable household income.
14BHA is a function of the number of children and the disposable household income.
15BCC is a function of the age of the children, the number of children, and the gross
household income.
16To obtain better precision in the simulation of the log-likelihood function, quasi-
random numbers (the random Halton sequence) are used instead of the standard pseudo-
Andrén and Andrén IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2016) 5:3 Page 21 of 24random numbers. The simulation noise is thereby reduced by a factor of 10, which indi-
cates that 10 Halton draws have the same precision as 100 pseudo-draws. In this study, 10
Halton draws are used per adult in each household. See Train (2003) for a detailed de-
scription of how to generate Halton random draws.
17In 2011, the EITC was extended yet another time. This final extension is not con-
sidered in this paper.
18For more information about the HEK database, see www.scb.se.
19In a first step, we select all working-age individuals aged 18–64 years who are not
fully or partially studying, are not early retired or are not self-employed. We obtained a
sample of approximately 7,300 households. In the second step, we excluded all house-
holds of singles (1,901 single men and 1,616 single women).
20One should keep in mind that βm and βw are only part of the expressions for the
marginal household utility of work hours for men and women, respectively, because
the household utility function contains squared terms of hours of work for the men
and the women in the household.
21These simulations are based on the estimated parameters of the model. Because
this model is numerically intensive and computaionally hard to estimate, it is difficult
to form standard errors for the parameter estimates. Bootstrapping is therefore not an
option because reestimating the model many times to form a distribution of estimated
parameters would be inconceivable and the analytical standard errors for this model
are unknown.
AppendixTable 8 Uncompensated wage elasticity from Swedish research literature estimated using discrete
structural labor supply models (percent)
Study by household type Wage elasticity Data (year) Selection
Married/cohabiting men
Flood et al. (2004) 0.05a HINK (1993, 1999)
Sacklén (2009) 0.06b HEK (2004)
Finansdepartementet (2010) 0.13c HEK (2007)
Married/cohabiting women
Flood et al. (2004) 0.10a HINK (1993, 1999)
Sacklén (2009) 0.10b HEK (2004)
Finansdepartementet (2010) 0.18c HEK (2007)
Single women
Andrén (2003) 0.77a HINK (1997, 1998) Single mothers
Flood et al. (2007) 0.62a LINDA (1999) Single mothers
Andersson & Hammarstedt (2008) 0.05a LINDA (2004) Foreign-born single women
Finansdepartementet (2010) 0.21c HEK (2007)
Single men
Finansdepartementet (2010) 0.09c HEK (2007)
Note: aPercentage change in the hours worked divided by the percentage change in gross earnings. bPercentage change
in the hours worked divided by the percentage change in disposable income, referring to the overall effect of
cohabitation and single habitation. cPercentage change in the hours worked divided by the percentage change in
disposable income, calculated by increasing the municipal tax of 10 percent. These elasticities capture both the extensive
and intensive margins
Table 9 Formula for the Swedish EITC, by step
Earned Income (EI) 0 – 0.91 BA 0.91 BA – 2.72 BA 2.72 BA – 7.00 BA 7.00 BA –
Step 1 (2007) (EI <0.79 BA) (0.79 BA < EI < 2.72 BA) (EI > 2.72 BA)
(EI – BD) * LITR (0.79 BA + 0.200 * (EI – 0.79 BA) – BD) * LITR (1.176 PBB – GA) * LITR
Step 2 (2008) (EI – BD) * LITR (0.91 BA + 0.200 * (EI – 0.91 BA) – BD) * LITR (1.272 BA + 0.033 * (EI – 2.72 BA) – BD) * LITR (1.413 BA – BD) * LITR
Step 3 (2009) (EI – BD) * LITR (0.91 BA + 0.250 * (EI – 0.91 BA) – BD) * LITR (1.363 BA + 0.065 * (EI – 2.72 BA) – BD) * LITR (1.642 BA – BD) * LITR
Step 4 (2010) (EI – BD) * LITR (0.91 BA + 0.304 * (EI – 0.91 BA) – BD) * LITR (1.461 BA + 0.095 * (EI – 2.72 BA) – BD) * LITR (1.868 BA – BD) * LITR















Table 10 Actual and fitted distributions of labor supply (in percent) and mean value of worked
hours (observed and predicted) by gender and type of household
Married/Cohabiting with children Married/Cohabiting without children
Observed Predicted Observed Predicted
Women
H = 0 15.0 15.3 8.5 10.8
H = 12 3.6 3.7 3.6 2.7
H = 27 23.7 15.1 12.7 7.5
H = 35 35.6 51.9 34.7 55.3
H = 38 11.5 6.2 24.3 13.2
H = 41 5.9 4.2 10.9 6.6
H = 50 4.7 3.5 5.2 3.9
E[H] 28.4 28.5 32.3 31.4
Men
H = 0 4.9 5.4 7.3 10.1
H = 12 1.6 2.4 2.1 1.5
H = 27 6.6 3.2 5.9 2.5
H = 35 17.1 11.6 12.7 7.8
H = 38 15.9 11.3 20.0 12.2
H = 41 40.4 57.7 39.1 57.3
H = 50 13.4 8.4 12.9 8.6
E[H] 37.3 37.4 36.4 36
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